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As an undergraduate,
I studied the philosophy of science at the LSE department of philosophy
that had been founded by Sir Karl Popper. As a
first year undergraduate, I asked what would Popper do if had been an
undergraduate student in his own department? |
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I guessed he would have proposed a big conjecture and send it off to the top scientific journal, Nature, to see what would happen. Having imagined this, I created a theory about rationality and the origins of Western Civilization, and posted it off. It was published in Nature in May just before my first year exams. |
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Unfortunately,
my understanding of
science and that of contemporary professional philosophers
occur in such
different conceptual worlds that I decided to become a scientist. I
obtained a medical council research scholarship and did a PhD at
University College London. |
At present, the relationship of science and its reasoning to truth is modeled in terms of justification. But justification is not the only possible way of analyzing this relationship. Here, I advocate a nonjustificatory philosophy based upon how scientific debate makes theories fit in regard to truth.
The key words in this approach are meta-cognition, problem
solving,
goals, modus tollens, truth timelines,
autonomy,
epistemological fitness, debate masturbation,
and quality control practices.
Meta-cognition describes the endeavor of philosophy.
The term meta-cognition comes
from psychology where it describes the awareness we have of
the processes
of our own cognition. Philosophy has this concern at a collective
level. An
example of meta-cognition is that the words we say
and speak are made up
of phones—that "cat" is made up of three phonetic elements /k/, /æ/
/t/. Such meta-cognition is not innate and due
largely to learning to
spell words alphabetically—a process that both objectifies and provides
a
representation for these otherwise hidden vocalization units. Those
without
this experience—illiterates, and those literate only in logographic
scripts—lack
a meta-cognition of phones—they instead
experience words in terms
of sound syllables, or just their meaning. The philosophy of
rationality
concerns meta-cognition of how people can
effectively use logical and
deduction to persuade each other about ideas in regard to their truth.
The philosophy
of science, this meta-cognition
concerns
the principles behind the reasoning that has made science in the last
four
hundred years so successful. Thus it is not a purely theoretical study,
it has
to focus upon what underlies an actual process that has happened and is
happening.
The meta-cognition of rational human reasoning identities it as problem
solving activity done between people involving logic
and deduction in
regard issues of truth and interpersonal persuasion. A key question in
philosophy is the nature of that problem solving,
in particular, what
is the underlying problem that defines the collective engagement with
truth
done by scientists.
Goals and sources define two
different two kinds of framework in which to understand problem
solving. Goal problem solving is
based around
competition: there exists a number of possible candidate solutions, and
the
problem solving concerns how to select which is picked in regard to
some
criteria determined by the problem’s goal. Source
problem solving, in
contrast, is based around identifying a transmission or verification:
there
exists a solution and the problem solving concerns finding a path or
establishment that links a candidate to that source. An example of goal problem solving is a baby
competition: there is a set of possible winners, and there exists a
criteria—the
opinions of judges in regard to the goal of selecting the most
beautiful baby.
An example of a source problem solving is finding and identifying a
missing
child search. There is only one solution and that might be found. A
different child,
however, similar to the child that has gone missing, does not provide a
solution. Only the solution is that defined by the problem’s
source—identity
with the missing child.
Modus tollens and modus ponens are two types of
valid deductive inference.
They offer two kinds of metatheoretical frameworks in which to
understand how
logic might underlie the nature of problem solving. In modus
tollens, given a
valid deduction, falsity transmits
from consequences to antecedents, in modus ponens, truths transmits
from
antecedents to consequences. In a closed system in which all truth
values are
known or can be established, any inference in one can be done in the
other.
However, in an open system, they are different and this is important in
understand the basis of persuasion. This is because the
persuasion of
ideas can be defined either in terms of seeking not hold false ones (modus
tollens), or to hold true ideas (modus ponenism). Modus
tollenism
involves reasoning being constructed as a goal type problem solving:
compete
ideas so false ones are identified leaving nonfalse ones—the
epistemological
focus is upon removing error. Modus ponenism involves reasoning being
constructed as a source type problem solving: find the right
antecedents and
the true consequences (your true beliefs) can be inferred by
appropriate
deductive transmissions—the epistemological focus is upon justification
and
warrentedness. A concrete example of modus tollenism
exists in the
rationality of airworthiness: no aircraft can be shown to be safe but
aircraft
can be shown to be liable to accidents. What we call safe aircraft are
those
that most intense endeavors fail to find are unsafe—the rational
authority of
airworthiness is constructed out of modus tollenist
reasoning—it is
about avoiding error.
Truth timelines are epistemological
chronologies of the actual (hidden)
truth or falsity of the theories that scientists hold. The goal of
science is
to hold true theories even if they can never be proved to be actually
true.
Einstein's general theory of relativity could well be true as so far it
has not
been shown be false. In contrast,
Truth timelines are hidden and science uses a proxy for truth: autonomy. Autonomy is the trait of the process that underlies the persuasion for holding a theory. That persuasion has autonomy is it is informative, and only informative about the truth of the theories, in particular, it does not informative about the process of the persuasion provided for a theory. Autonomy can be lost at many stages by which support or persuasion is provided for theories. It might be at the stage of evidence: a fact might be true only of the particular part of the universe but used in regard to a universe process—it loses autonomy because knowing where data is gathered to support a theory informs you about the support it gains. Autonomy might be lost through evidence being an artifact: the star on the plate is a spark of dirt on the telescope lens: knowing about the presence of that dirt informs you about the mistaken support given for the theory. Autonomy might be lost in the process by which scientists persuade each other about theories, for example, because of dominant personalities, interests in advances theories or limitations in statistical competence. In these case, knowledge about these factors informs us about whether an theory will be held or not.
Epistemological
fitness concerns
the attempts of those seeking
truth to create the environment within scientific debate such that
theories
which successfully propagate with autonomy in regard to their truth.
History, human experience and research shows that a major factor
competing
against truth as a fitness is debate masturbation.
This refers to
the frailty of human reasoning that it often finds arguments persuasive
due to
nonrational factors such as personal interest, false or faulty
deduction, and
other errors. As such, this persuasive causes ideas to be held or
spread due
factors that are not separate from the reasoner or the process of
debate—they
do not contain the intercourse with an external world: they lack
autonomy. Such
factors give false ideas are warranted that causes them to be more fit
than
nonfalse ones in persuasion.
Quality control practices is how the
fitness of theories is limited
to and only to truth. Quality
control
practice is an activity central to any complex system: from
DNA (in the
form of code checking) to organisms (in the form of checks against
cancer
cells). In society, a critical function of institutions is their role
as quality
control practices upon those with power or actions in regard
to
maladministration, corruption or ineffectiveness (see my ideas upon
democracy).